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INTRODUCTION
Many citizens would probably agree that sexual intimacies between consenting
adults should be free from governmental interference. While several states have
provided their citizens with increased protection from governmental interference
for private, personal behavior and struck down sodomy statutes under their state
constitutions,' the Louisiana Supreme Court has not yet considered the
constitutionality of the state's sodomy law, Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:89.2
However, in State v. Smith,3 the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal struck
down the statute as an unconstitutional invasion of privacy under the Louisiana
Constitution. The fourth circuit's decision has placed the issue of the state
sodomy law's constitutionality squarely before the Louisiana Supreme Court. As
this comment will explain, the current sodomy law is a violation of privacy under
Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution, and the Smith case offers the court the
opportunity to ensure the privacy of Louisiana's citizens.
Part I of this comment discusses some United States Supreme Court cases that
have addressed the issue of individual privacy and the efforts of state courts to
distinguish these decisions. In order to evaluate the arguments asserted against the
statutes, to isolate the states' justifications for upholding the statutes, and to
understand the courts' varying justifications for striking down the statutes under
state law, Part I focuses on decisions of state courts that have overturned their
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1. Those states whose sodomy laws have been struck down on state law grounds include:
Tennessee. see Campbell v. Sundquist. 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Pennsylvania, see
Commonwealth v. Bonadio. 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980); Kentucky, see Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842
S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); New York, see People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980); Alabama. see
Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998); Texas, see State v. Morales, 826 S.W. 2d 201 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992); and Iowa, see State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 359 (Iowa 1976).
2. La. R.S.14:89 (1986) defines a crime against nature as:
(I)The unnatural carnal copulation by a human being with another of the same sex or
opposite sex or an animal, except that anal sexual intercourse between two human beings
shall not be deemed as a crime against nature when done under any of the circumstances
described in R.S. 14:41, 14:42, 14:42.1 or 14:43. Emission is not necessary; and, when
committed by a human being with another, the use of the genital organ of one of the
offenders of whatever sex is sufficient to constitute the crime.
(2) The solicitation by a human being of another with the intent to engage in any unnatural
carnal copulation for compensation.
B. Whoever violates the provisions of this Section shall be fined not more than two
thousand dollars, or imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than five years. or
both.
3. 729 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999).
4. La. Const. ar. I 15 provides: "Right to Privacy: Section 5. Every person shall be secure in
his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches.
seizures, or invasions of privacy."
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sodomy statutes. It also notes several cases in which state sodomy statutes have
been upheld under state or federal law. Part III first describes the right of privacy
in Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution as interpreted by the Louisiana
Supreme Court. It then presents an analysis of the judicial history of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 14:89 and the facts and issues of the Smith case currently before
the court. The arguments of the state and the defendant are analyzed with a
comparison to the decisions from other state courts. This comment concludes that
the reasoning used by other state courts to strike down state statues and the prior
interpretations of the "privacy protections" in the Louisiana Constitution support
a decision that Louisiana's sodomy statute is an unconstitutional invasion of
privacy under Louisiana law.5
I. FEDERAL LAW BACKGROUND AND STATE COURT RESPONSE
A. Background and History
The recent history of the right of privacy as applied to personal autonomy is
well established. Although not an enumerated right under the United States
Constitution, the right of privacy is a guarantee upon which American citizens have
come to expect and rely. The common law right of privacy was described by
Justice Brandeis as "the most comprehensive of rights. ' 6 While the right to privacy
has since been interpreted to expand areas of personal autonomy, the Supreme
Court has also defined limits to the right to privacy.!
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court began to expand the protections of the right
of privacy in areas affecting the personal autonomy of the individual. In Griswold
v. Connecticut,' the United States Supreme Court took one of its first steps in
recognizing a fundamental right to privacy and held that the government could not
prohibit the use of contraceptives by married persons.9 Later, in Eisenstadt v.
5. This comment does not purport to delve into the numerous intricacies of the federal or state
right to privacy but rather focuses on those issues that are pertinent to the evaluation of La. R.S. 14:89(1986) under the state constitution. Additionally, the subject matter deals only with the private
consensual acts between adults. It does not advocate any repeal of laws prohibiting forced sexual acts.
acts in public, or acts with children or animals.
6. Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478,48 S. Ct. 564,604 (1928) (Brandeis, J.. dissenting).
7. Please note that the cases discussed in the ensuing section are only intended to serve as a
representative sample. The section does not begin to attempt to discuss the mass of jurisprudence
surrounding the federal right to privacy.
8. 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
9. In the majority opinion. Justice Douglas explained that several of the guarantees in the Bill
of Rights created a "penumbra" or "zone of privacy" that the government could not infringe. The Court
held that the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments established a zone of privacy protected
from government intrusion. Id at 483-85, 85 S. Ct. at 1681. The three concurrences reached the same
conclusion as the majority, but in different ways. Justice Goldberg explained that just as the NinthAmendment protected rights that were not enumerated in the first eight amendments, the Fourteenth
Amendment should protect against government actions that infringe rights not detailed in the Bill of
Rights. Id. at 488-89, 85 S. Ct. at 1684. Justice Harlan argued that the Fourteenth Amendment protects
those values that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 500, 85 S. Ct. at 1690 (citing
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Baird," the Supreme Court held that the government could not prohibit the use of
contraceptives by non-married persons." In Roe v. Wade, 2 the Court held, inter
alia, that the right of privacy limits a legislature's freedom to proscribe or regulate
a woman's right to an abortion.' 3 While the Court has been somewhat willing to
extend the right of privacy in areas such as parenting and education,'4 family
relationships,' marriage,' 6 contraception, 7 and abortion,' it has been more
reluctant to establish any general protection for adult consensual sexual behavior.
In Bowers v. Hardwick '9 the Supreme Court held that the Georgia state law
proscribing homosexual sodomy was constitutional because the United States
Constitution did not provide a fundamental right to engage in such acts. The Court
reasoned that "[n]one of the fundamental rights announced in this Court's prior
cases involving family relationships, marriage, or procreation bear any resemblance
to -the right asserted in this case. '""° The dissent in Bowers argued that
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152 (1937)) Finally, Justice White opined that
an ends/means analysis should be used to evaluate the state interest in the protection of privacy
interests. Id. at 502, 85 S. Ct. at 1691-94.
10. 405 U.S. 438,92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972).
11. The Court explained that, "[ilf the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453.92 S. Ct.
at 1038.
12. 410 U.S. 113.93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
13. The holding in Roe has been admittedly limited by the Court's subsequent decision in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791(1992).
In Casey, the Court held that legislatures were allowed to regulate the right of a woman to have an
abortion as long as the restrictions did not impose an undue burden.
14. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571(1925) (striking down a
statute requiring children to attend public schools because it infringed on the "liberty" of parents "to
direct the upbringing" and education of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct.
625 (1923) (striking down a state law that prohibited teachers from teaching foreign languages to young
children.).
15. See Prince v. Massachusetts. 321 U.S. 158, 64 S. Ct. 438 (1944).
16. See Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967) (holding that the state could not
prohibit marriage between whites and non-whites.).
17. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479.85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965) (holding married couples
have the right to obtain contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972)
(holding non-married individuals had a fundamental right to obtain contraceptives).
18. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (allowing states to regulate
abortions only as long as there is no undue burden imposed on the mother).
19. 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841(1986). However, Bowers has been questioned and criticized
by a number of scholars. See Developments In the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law. 102 Harv. L
Rev. 1508, 1523 n.30 (1989). Also, Justice Powell, the "swing vote" in Bowers, has commented that
his decision was "probably a mistake." See Anand Agneshwar, Powell Concedes Error in Key Privacy
Ruling: Vote to Sustain Sodomy Law at High Court Called "Mistake," N.Y.LU. Oct. 26. 1990.
20. Id. The Court was equally unaffected by the assertion of the defendant that the homosexual
conduct should be protected when camed out in the privacy of one's home. It weakly distinguished
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S. Ct. 1243 (1969). in which the Court had extended the right of
privacy to protect the viewing of pornographic materials in the privacy of one's home. The Court
reasoned that if Stanley was extended to protect the behavior in Bowers, it would be hard to limit
200]
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interpretations in prior cases allowed an extension of the right to privacy to the
facts in Bowers. The dissent explained,
Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact
that the governing majority in a state has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice .... Second, individual decisions by married
persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even
when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of "liberty" protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2'
In the opinion of the dissenters, homosexual conduct should be protected under the
same analysis that extended the right to privacy to parenting, contraception,
abortion, and possession of pornography in the home.22
B. State Constitutionalism
As the United States Supreme Court has limited the growth of individual rights
under the federal Constitution, the concept of state constitutionalism has enabled
state courts to provide increased protection and broader individual rights to their
citizens under state law.23 State courts often interpret their state Declarations of
Rights to afford increased protection as long as federally protected rights are not
infringed. The United States Supreme Court, therefore, has been said to provide
a "legal floor" for individual rights, but has no role in the interpretation given to
protection of future activities because they would be carried out in the privacy of one's home. For
example, the Court stated, "it would be difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed right to homosexual
conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even though they
are committed in the home. We are unwilling to start down that road." Bowers, at 195-96. 106 S. Ct.
at 2846.
21. Id. at 216,106 S. Ct. at 2857 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,85 S. Ct. 1678
(1965)).
22. See discussion infra surrounding Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18(Ga. 1998). Itis interesting
to note that the very statute that the United States Supreme Court upheld as constitutional under federal
law in Bowers was struck down in 1999 as unconstitutional by the Georgia Supreme Court on state
constitutional law grounds in Powel.
23. William J. Brennan Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Rival of State Constitutions
as Guardians of Individual Rights. 61 N.Y. U. L Rev. 535 (1986); See also Paula A. Brantner,
Removing Bricks from a Wall of Discrimination: State Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Laws,
19 Hastings Const. ILQ. 495, 509-10 (1992) (noting that state constitutions are generally more
comprehensive, provide more explicit guarantees of rights, and even grant affirmative rights to their
citizens); Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv. L Rev.
1324 (1982), Ronald L Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions Away From a Reactionary Approach,
9 Hastings Const. L Q. I (1981); Unde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights,
9 U. Bait. L Rev. 379 (1980); and William Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L Rev. 484, 501 (1977), in which Brennan makes a stinging plea to state
courts to move beyond the protections given by the United States Supreme Court. Justice Brennan said,
"[sltate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protection of the Federal
Constitution. State Constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties. Their protections often expand
beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law."
[Vol.. 60
state law by state courts.2 ' In accordance with this principle, state courts have often
diverged from federal interpretations of law by relying on their respective
constitutions."
The Louisiana Supreme Court has frequently followed the precepts of state
constitutionalism and provided greater protection for individual rights than is
afforded under the federal Constitution. The court has offered increased protection
for privacy guarantees under the state constitution as it has done with other
constitutional guarantees, some of which are stated more broadly than in federal
law and some of which have no corresponding federal guarantee.2" In State v.
Perry, the Louisiana Supreme Court clearly articulated its adherence to the
principles of state constitutionalism. As Justice Dennis explained,
[B]ecause our state Declaration of Rights incorporates or expands most
of the federal Bill of Rights standards, a decision by this court upholding
an individual's state constitutional right rarely will call for further review
by the Supreme Court. As long as one party's state rights are expanded
without infringement on another individual's federal right, our state
constitution may be used to supplement or expand federally guaranteed
constitutional rights."
The court in Perry cited state constitutional grounds in concluding that the
state was not permitted to medicate an insane prisoner on death row in order to
24. - Paul W. Kahn, Comment, Interpretation andAuthority in State Constitutionalism, 106 Harv.
L Rev. 1147.1148 (1993). See also Nan Feyler. The Use of The State Constitutional Right to Privacy
to Defeat State Sodomy Laws. 14 N.Y.U. Rev. L & Soc. Change 973. 984 (1986).
25. See, e.g.. People v. Mitchell. 650 N.E.2d 1014 (Ill. 1995) (holding that the Illinois Supreme
Court may construe provisions of the Illinois Constitution to provide more expansive protections than
comparable federal constitutional provisions); Baker v. City of Fairbanks. 471 P. 2d 386 (Alaska 1970)
(expanding the rights of criminal defendants beyond the protections of the federal government when
it held that defendants were entitled to a jury trial in any criminal prosecution): People v. Fields. 914
P.2d 832 (Cal. 1996) (stating that the California Constitution is a document of independent force and
effect that may be interpreted in a manner more protective of a defendant's rights than extended by the
federal Constitution); ProneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74. 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980)
(holding that the California courts could provide citizens greater freedom than the federal Constitution.
Specifically, the California Supreme Court could permit its citizens to solicit signatures at the private
mail and the exercise of that fight did not infringe on the property rights of the mall owners.);
Commonwealth v. Wasson. 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (Kentucky court not bound on state law
grounds by the decision in Bowers); Cooper v. California. 386 U.S. 58,87 S. Ct. 788 (1967) (reasoning
that "a state court is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than
those this court holds to be necessary upon federal standards.").
26. John Devlin. Privacy and Abortion Rights Under the Louisiana State Constitution: Could
Roe v. Wade be Alive and Well in the Bayou State?, 51 La. L Rev. 685.688-89 (comment details rights
expanded by the Louisiana Supreme Court).
27. State v. Perry. 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992) (citing PruneYard Shopping Centerv. Robins. 447
U.S. 74, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980)); see also Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State
Courts, 18 Ga. L Rev. 165, 179 (1984): Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State
Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv. L Rev. 1324, 1334 (1982).
200 COMMENTS
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
carry out an execution." The court reasoned that such an act would be a violation
of the prisoner's right to personal autonomy in the sense of a right to control one's
own medical treatment, as found in Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution.29
The majority opinion further explained that the Louisiana Supreme Court should
not rule on a parallel, federal constitutional question if there is also a state ground
on which the case could be decided. The Court noted that when state issues are
addressed first, there is "[g]reater judicial efficiency and coherence.""
I1. PRIVACY AND SODOMY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS:
SISTER STATE EXPERIENCES
The United States Supreme Court has not overruled its decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick and has continued to maintain that homosexual sodomy is not protected
by the federal Constitution.3 Therefore, state legislatures and judicial bodies have
had to determine whether acts of sodomy are protected by their state constitutions.32
28. 601 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992).
29. Id.
30. Id at 750. Cf. Large v. Superior Court, 714 P.2d 399, 405 (Ariz. 1986); City of Portland v.Jacobsky. 496 A.2d 646, 648 (Me. 1985); State v. Chaisson, 486 A.2d 297, 301 (N.H. 1984); Sterling
v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (Or. 1983); State v. Coe, 679 P.2d 353, 359 (Wash. 1984).
31. It has been argued, however, that the holding in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S. Ct.1620 (1996), "chips away" at the thrust of the decision in Bowers. In Romer, the Supreme Court held
that Colorado's proposed amendment to its state constitution that prohibited laws that would make
sexual orientation an impermissible ground on which to discriminate violated the Fourteenth
Amendment under a rational basis analysis. See, e.g., Katherine M. Hamill, Romer v. Evans: Dullingthe Equal Protection Gloss on Bowers v. Hardwick, 77 B.U. L Rev. 655 (1997) (concluding thatBowers can no longer be used by lower courts to validate laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation); Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built in a Day: The Subtle Transformation in JudicialArgument Over Gay Rights, 1996 Wis. L Rev. 893, 917 (noting that Romer's most noteworthy
achievement was its "failure to cite anything to which the continued validity of Bowers could be
moored").
32. Act of July 17. 1978 ch. 166, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws 219; Act of May 12, 1975. ch. 71, sec.4-12, 1975, Cal. Stat. 131, 133-136; Colorado Criminal Code, chs. 40-1-403, 40-3-40, 1971 Colo.Sess. Laws 388, 423; Conn. Penal Code, Pub. Act No. 828, sec. 66-91, 1969, Conn. Pub. Acts 1554,1579-85; Delaware Criminal Code, ch. 497 sec. 766, 767. 58 Del. Laws 1611, 1665-66(1972); Haw.Penal Code Act 9 sec. 733-735, 1972, Hawaii Sess. Laws 32, 90-01; Act of Feb. 25, 1976, Pub. LawNo. 148 ch. 4 sec. 2, 1976 Ind. Acts 718. 733-34; Iowa Criminal Code, ch. 1245, sec. 901-906, 1976
Iowa Acts 549, 558-559; Maine Criminal Code, ch. 499 sec. 251-255, 1975 Me. Laws 1273, 1297-1300; Nebraska Criminal Code, LB. 38 sec. 32-38, 1977 Neb. Laws 88, 100-102; Act of July 2, 1973,
ch. 532:26, 1973 N.H. Laws 999, 1011; New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice. ch. 95, sec. 14:0 to 14:3,1978 N.J.Laws 482, 547-550; Act of Apr. 3, 1975, ch. 109, 1975 Laws 265, 266-267; Act of Dec. 14,1972, sec. 2907.01-.07, 1972 Ohio Laws 1966, 1906-1911; Oregon Criminal Code of 1971, sec. 104-120. 1972 Or. Laws 1873, 1907-1910; Crimes Code, No. 334, ch. 31. 1972 Pa. Laws 1983, 1528-31;
Act of Feb. 26, 1976, ch. 158 sec. 22-2 to B4, 1976 S.D.. Laws 227, 260-261; Washington CriminalCode, ch. 260, sec 9A.88,100, 1975 Wash. Laws 817, 858; Act of Mar. II, 1976, ch. 43, 1976
W.Va.Acts 241; Act of February 24, 1977, ch. 70, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 228. 228-310 (This list isderived in part from Yao Apasu-Gbotsu et al., Note, Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in
the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. Miami L Rev. 521, 526-27 (1986)).
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Because the issue presented in Smith is res nova to the Louisiana Supreme Court,
it may benefit the court to consider other states' rationales in similar cases as a
background for its own decision."
State sodomy statutes have been challenged on a number of grounds under
state constitutions, including theories of: 1) violation of privacy, 2) violation of
equal protection, ' 3) vagueness," 4) cruel and unusual punishment,3 ' and 5) the
establishment of religion.37 In his appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the
defendant in Smith has challenged the state sodomy statute solely as a violation of
privacy. This challenge seems to be the best founded argument since the Louisiana
33. See Nan Feyler, The Use of the State Constitutional Right to Privacy to Defeat State Sodomy
Laws, 14 N.Y.U.Rev. L & Soc. Change 973, 991 (1986), in which she states, "Case law from other
states may prove persuasive. While these decisions will not be binding on another state court, they help
demonstrate the desirability of expansive state privacy protection, and work to assure a state court that
it is not alone in interpreting its state constitution forcefully."
34. See, e.g., Rapheal v. Hogan, 305 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (holding that the state's
consensual sodomy law did not invidiously discriminate between married and unmarried individuals);
Neville v. State, 430 A.2d 570 (Md. 1981) (holding that married and unmarried individuals could be
prosecuted for engaging in perverted practices under the circumstances of the case); State v. Pilcher,
242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976) (holding that equal protection required that private, consensual acts of
sodomy by unmarried persons receive the same constitutional protection as did similar acts by married
couples); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936,938 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that aconsensual sodomy statute
that prohibited "deviate sexual intercourse" defined elsewhere in the penal law to include "sexual
conduct between persons not married to each other" was invalid because it violated the right to equal
protection enjoyed by such persons. The statute discriminated on its face between married and
unmarried persons and there was no rational basis for the distinction).
35. See, e.g., State v. Bateman, 547 P.2d 6,9 (Ariz. 1976) (holding that a state sodomy law that
employed the term "crime against nature" was not void for vagueness); Jones v. State, 456 P.2d 429
(Nev. 1969) (holding that the law that proscribed the "infamous crime against nature" and established
special penalties where the offense was committed by force or threat with a minor, was not
unconstitutionally vague); State v. White, 217 A.2d 212 (Me. 1966) (holding that a law prohibiting "the
crime against nature with mankind or beast" sufficiently described the offense).
36. See People v. Roberts, 256 Cal. App. 2d 488 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a law
criminalizing the commission of oral sex violated the state and federal constitutional bans on cruel and
unusual punishment.); Pratt v. Pratt, 615 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that a sentence of 5 to 10
years for sodomy was not cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Thompson, 558 P.2d 1079 (Kan.
1976) (holding that a law authorizing higher sentences for forcible sodomy than were available for
forcible rape did not violate the constitutional provisions regarding cruel and unusual punishment and
equal protection under the law); Hughes v. State, 287 A.2d 299 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) (upholding
a law that allowed sentences of up to 10 years for persons engaging in unnatural or perverted sexual
practices against a challenge of cruel and unusual punishment).
37. See, e.g., Hatheway v. Secretary of Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a
military law that prohibited "unnatural carnal copulation" did not violate the establishment of religion
despite the religious origin of the laws against sodomy); State v. Rhinehart, 424 P.2d 906 (Wash. 1967)
(holding that the sodomy statute did not violate the establishment clause. Further, there was no merit
in the contention that the statute violated religious rights by imposing the ethics of the majority on
others who followed "homosexual practices."); Stewart v. United States, 364 A.2d 1205 (D.C. 1976)
(holding that even though the sodomy laws were clearly motivated by religious forces, it did not make
the local sodomy statute a violation of the constitutional prohibition of laws affecting the establishment
of religion). See also Nan eyler, The Use of the State Constitutional Right to Privacy to Defeat
Sodomy Laws, 14 N.Y.U. Rev. L & Soc. Change 973,979 (1986).
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Supreme Court has previously been willing to strike down laws that infringe on the
personal autonomy of its citizens. The following section, therefore, will discuss
similar challenges brought in other states and consider the application of those
challenges under Louisiana law.
A. Unconstitutional Invasion of Privacy Under State Constitutions
A challenge to sodomy laws as an unconstitutional invasion of privacy
compels state courts to consider a "right to privacy" that is broader than ,the
corresponding federal right as interpreted in Bowers v. Hardwick." It should be
noted initially that many state legislatures repealed their sodomy statutes before the
courts were able to interpret them in light of their state constitutions. The courts
of several other states have invalidated their sodomy laws based on their state
constitutions.3 However, some states have refused to diverge from the federal
interpretation of Bowers.'
1. Kentucky: A "Rational Basis" Approach
In Commonwealth v. Wasson," the Kentucky Supreme Court rejected the
Bowers interpretation of the limits of the right of privacy. The defendant in
38. 478 U.S. 186, 106. ,Ct. 2841 (1986).
39. See e.g.. Powellv. State, 510 S.E.2d 18(Ga. 1998); Campbellv. Sundquist, 926S.W.2d 250
(Tenn. Cf. App. 1996); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); State v. Morales, 869
S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994) (lowerTexas court enjoined furtherenforcement of the sodomy statute); State
v. Pilcher, 242 N.W. 2d 348 (Iowa 1976); State v. Ciuffini, 395 A.2d 904 (NJ. 1978) (extending
privacy rights to consensual sodomy); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980) (invalidating a
statute criminalizing consensual sodomy on federal grounds, ignoring state grounds relied on below);
Commonwealth v. Bonadio. 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980) (holding unconstitutional a statute prohibiting
deviate sexual intercourse). Discussed more fully iqfra.
40. See. e.g., Neville v. State. 430 A.2d 570 (Md. 1981) (holding that the Maryland perverted
practices statute was constitutionally applied where the defendants engaged in intimate sexual activities
in daylight hours in a place open to the public); Kelly v. State, 412 A.2d 1274 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1980) (holding in part that the right of privacy does not protect the practice of fellatio); State v. Santos.
413 A.2d 58,68 (R.I. 1980) (holding that "the (federal constitutionall right of privacy is inapplicable
to private unnatural copulation between unmarried adults"); State v. Poe, 259 S.E.2d 304 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1979) (holding in part that "the State, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment can classify
unmarried persons so as to prohibit fellatio between males and females without forbidding the same acts
between married couples." And further concluding that "the constitutional right of privacy does not
protect the defendant in this case."); Carter v. State, 500 S.W.2d 368 (Ark. 1973) (holding that the
statute prohibiting sodomywas not an unconstitutional invasion of privacy under the federal or state
constitutions). See also Thomas E. Pryor, Does Arkansas Code Section 5.14.122 Violate Arkansas's
Constitutional Guarantee of Equal Protection?, 51 Ark. L. Rev. 521 (1998); Dixon v. State, 268
N.E.2d 84, 86 (Ind. 1971) (concluding that there is no constitutional right to privacy that protects
heterosexual consensual oral sex); Juli A. Morris Challenging Sodomy Statutes: State Constitutional
Protections for Sexual Privacy, 66 Ind. L. 609, 619 (1991) (noting that, "[flor the most part, state
courts have failed to develop a jurisprudence of privacy rights that can stand apart from federal
doctrine .... '); and Schochet v. State, 580 A.2d 176 (Md. 1990).
41. 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992). Note also that the two state supreme court cases that struck
down criminal sodomy statutes before Wasson did not directly address the issue of homosexual sodomy
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Wasson argued that his arrest for solicitation of deviate sexual intercourse was
unconstitutional under the state constitution. The Kentucky Supreme Court agreed
that the statute violated both the privacy and equal protection guarantees of the
state constitution.4" Initially, the Kentucky Supreme Court explained that its
decision would.not emulate the decision in Bowers. In determining the limits of
behavior protected by the Kentucky Constitution, the court noted that it was not
restricted to the federal interpretation and recognition of those rights which "are
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' 43
Kentucky had recognized, on more than one occasion, that its constitution
provided more protections to its citizens than the minimum provided by the federal
Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court." From an early date, the
Kentucky courts had seized upon the expansion of individual privacy and
continually recognized a right to individual privacy that is broader than the federal
right to privacy.45 In a 1909 decision, for example, the Kentucky court struck down
an ordinance that criminalized possession of intoxicating liquor, even for private
use.' As the court explained in Commonwealth v. Campbell, "let a man therefore
be ever so abandoned in his principles, or vicious in his practice, provided he keeps
his wickedness to himself, and does not offend against the rules of public decency,
he is out of the reach of human laws."47 In relating Campbell to Wasson, the court
explained that when Campbell was decided, the use of alcohol was much more
offensive to the "moral majority" than deviate sexual behavior is today.'
The Kentucky court further explained that the textual and structural differences
between the United States Bill of Rights and the Kentucky Bill of Rights and the
under their respective constitutions. See Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 49-50 (Pa. 1980)
(holding that a statute criminalizing sodomy between consenting unmarried adults violated both the
Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936,939-43 (N.Y. 1980)
(striking down the criminal sodomy statute as a violation of the right to privacy and equal protection
under the United States Constitution). Discussed more fully infra.
42. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d. at 501. The Kentucky court also held that the statute was
unconstitutional as an infringement on the Equal Protection Clause of the state constitution as
homosexuals represented an identifiable class. The state had not met its burden in proving a "legitimate
governmental interest justifying a distinction" based on sexual preference.
43. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 493; cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186. 192, 106 S. Ct. 2841
(1986).
44. The court listed as reference cases: Ingrain v. Commonwealth, 801 S.W.2d 321 (K y. 1990)
(involving protection against double jeopardy); Rose v. Council for Better Education.. Inc.. 790 S.W.2d
186 (Ky. 1989) (holding that children in poorer areas had a constitutional right to an adequate education
in a wealthier school district): and Fannin v. Williams, 655 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1983) (concluding that
it was unconstitutional for public school to provide textbooks to private schools even though the federal
constitution allowed such acts).
45. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 173 S.W. 340 (Ky. 1915) (holding that the police power
of the state could only be called into play when it was reasonably necessary to protect the public health
and morals or safety); Hcrshberg v. City of Barbourville, 133 S.W. 985 (Ky. 1911) (holding
unconstitutional an ordinance that attempted to regulate the smoking of cigarettes in the privacy of
one's home); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 247 S.W. 749 (Ky. 1923).
46. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 117 S.W. 383 (Ky. 1909).
47. d at 385-86.
48. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 494.
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judiciary's treatment of such differences provided the basis for a decision distinctfrom Bowers. The first and second sections of the Kentucky Bill of Rights provide
its citizens with seemingly broader rights than the corresponding provisions of the
United States Bill of Rights:
All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and
inalienable rights, among which-may be reckoned:
First: The right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties.
Third: The right of seeking and pursuing their safety and happiness.
Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of
freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority.49
While the "right of privacy" is not explicit in the above sections, commentaries
from the Kentucky Constitutional Convention explain how the provisions secure
personal freedoms." The convention intended to assure that individual freedom
and protection from governmental interference were paramount in an ordered
society unless the actions of an individual infringed upon the rights of another."'
In its defense of the statute at issue in Wasson, the state did not present any
witnesses, nor did it offer scientific or sociological evidence. Rather, the state
sought to uphold the statute with two justifications. First, the state argued that the
majority had the right to criminalize any sexual activity that it deemed immoral,
hence "what is beyond the pale of the majoritarian morality is beyond the limits of
constitutional protection."" Second, the state argued that Kentucky had always
punished sodomy as an offense and should continue on the same course. 3 The
court was not persuaded by either of the state's arguments and opined that the
statute regulated "the most profoundly private conduct and in so doing
impermissibly invades the privacy of the citizens of this state." 4
In explaining why the morals of the majority could not subsume the rights of
the minority, the Kentucky court adopted the analysis from the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court which had held that:
49. Kentucky Constitution I§ 1 and 2 (1891). See supra note 44 for other aras in which the
Kentucky court was willing to expand state rights further than the federal government had provided.
50. Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates in the 1890 Convention, Vol. 1, 718.
51. See id. (. Proctor Knott).
52. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 490.
53. Id. The court also declared that "[d]eviate sexual intercourse conducted in private by
consenting adults is not beyond the protections of the guarantees of individual liberty in our Kentucky
Constitution simply because proscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots." Id. at 493(citing
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192, 106 S. Ct. at 2844).
54. Id. at 491. The court also noted that under the rationale of the Kentucky court in
Commonwealth v. Smith, 173 S.W. 340 (Ky. 1915), "immorality in private which does 'not operate to
the detriment of others' is placed beyond the reach of state action by the guarantees of liberty in the
Kentucky Constitution." Id. at 496.
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With respect to regulation of morals, the police power should properly be
exercised to protect each individual's right to be free from interference in
defining and pursuing his own morality but not to enforce a majority
morality on persons whose conduct does not harm others. No harm to the
secular interest of the community is involved in atypical sex practice in
private between consenting adult partners .... No significant state interest
justifies legislation of norms simply because a particular belief is
followed by a number of people....-s
Also, in Campbell the court had noted that in another context "the theory of...
[Kentucky's] government is to allow the largest liberty to the individual
commensurate with public safety." 6 Because the private sexual acts between adults
did not threaten public safety, the Wasson court remained firm in its conviction that
the privacy guarantees inherent in the Kentucky Constitution could not be pierced
by the preference of the majority.
The Wasson court was equally unpersuaded by the state's second argument
that the statute was constitutional because the state had always punished sodomy.
Initially, the court disagreed with the state's assumption that the current Kentucky
law was the same as it always had been." The statute at issue in Wasson was
broader than prior law because the "common law tradition punished neither oral
copulation nor any form of deviate sexual activity between women" and under prior
Kentucky law, penetration of the mouth was not sufficient for a conviction of
sodomy." The acts may have been seen by the majority as immoral, but they were
not criminalized. s9 The court specifically noted, "[d]eviate sexual intercourse
conducted in private by consenting adults is not beyond the protections of
individual liberty in our Kentucky Constitution simply because 'proscriptions
against that conduct have ancient roots.""IW Therefore, the "historical" argument
by the state was not sufficient to justify the regulation of private consensual sexual
behavior. The state court noted, however, that if the current law was identical to
55. Wasson, 842 S.W 2d at 498 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1980)
and Model Penal Code, § 207.5-Sodomy and related offenses)). Comment (tent. draft no. 4. 1955).
Quoting from Bonadio. the Kentucky court explained that the language in the decision was significant
"because of the common heritage shared by the Kentucky Bill of Rights of 1792 and the Pennsylvania
Bill of Rights of 1790. Decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreting like clauses in the
Pennsylvania Constitution are uniquely persuasive in interpreting [the Kentucky Constitution]."
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 498.
56. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 495 (quoting Commonwealth v. Campbell, 117 S.W. 383, 387 (Ky.
1909)).
57. Ky. Rev. Stat. 510.01 (1999) punishes "deviate sexual intercourse with another"; Ky. Rev.
Stat. 510.01(l) (1999) defines deviate sexual intercourse as "any act of sexual gratification involving
the sex organs of one (1) person and the mouth or anus of another."
58. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 491.
59. See Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 1 18 S.W. 943 (Ky. 1909) in which the court held that
penetration of the mouth was not sodomy. Rather, anal penetration was required for such a conviction.
60. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 493 (internal citations omitted).
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prior sodomy laws, the state's argument might have supported the historical and
traditional. basis for punishing acts of sodomy.
2. Tennessee: A "Strict Scrutiny" Approach
In Campbell v. Sundquist, the Tennessee Court of Appeals upheld the decision
of a lower court to strike down the Homosexuals Practices Act ("HPA")" and held,
inter alia, that an adult's right to engage in consensual and non-commercial sexual
activities in the privacy of a home is a matter of intimate personal concern which
is at the heart of the state's privacy rights.6' The Tennessee court began its analysis,
like the court in Wasson, by declaring that it was not bound by the holding in
Bowers." It then determined that the Tennessee Constitution guaranteed the
fundamental right of privacy to all citizens and found that the HPA infringed upon
that right. Therefore, the state was required to provide compelling reasons for the
imposition of the statute to satisfy the "strict scrutiny" analysis employed by the
court.
Before offering justifications for the HPA, the state argued that Article I, § 8
of the Tennessee Constitution had traditionally been interpreted to provide state
citizens with the same "privacy rights" as the federal Constitution." Therefore, the
rights of Tennessee citizens should only encompass the same rights granted by the
federal Constitution. The court, however, disagreed with the state's assumption
that Article 1, §8 was the sole source of privacy protections and with the assertion
that the state rights were coextensive with those granted by the federal Constitution.
Even if some Tennessee rights were drafted in a manner similar to the federal
rights, there was no reason to assume that there must be complete congruency in
the interpretations of those rights.' The court held that the Tennessee right to
privacy stemmed from several sources including Article I, § 8, and several sections
of the Tennessee Declaration of Rights." The United States Supreme Court's
61. The Homosexual Practices Act criminalized certain private sexual acts between persons of
the same sex. Tennessee Homosexual Practices Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-510 (1991).
62. 926 S.W.2d 250,262 (Tenn. 1996). The court also held that the homosexuals were allowed
to maintain their action under the Declaratory Judgment Act even though none of them had been
prosecuted under the HPA and that the HPA was unconstitutional. In Campbell, homosexuals brought
a declaratory judgment action seeking to find the HPA unconstitutional. The circuit court entered
summary judgment for homosexuals. The court of appeals affirmed the standing of the homosexuals
and held that they were entitled to maintain their action under declaratory judgment even though none
of them had been prosecuted under the HPA.
63. Sundquist. 926 S.W.2d at 259.
64. id. at 258. Cases offered in support of this statement include: Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v.
Crider. 19 S.W. 618 (Tenn. 1892); State v. Hale. 840 S.W. 2d 307 (Tenn. 1992); Dearbore v. State,
575 S.W. 2d 259 (Tenn. 1978); Daughtery v. State. 393 S.W. 2d 739 (Tenn. 1965).
65. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d at 260.
66. The court found several sources for the right to privacy including: Tennessee Constitution
Article I, § 8: "No man to be disturbed but by law.... That no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or
deseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or
deprived of his life, liberty or property...." Tennessee Bill of Rights: J3: "[Nlo human authority can,
in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience:" § 7: "[The people shall be
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construction of the Due Process Clause and the federal provision analogous to
Article I, § 8 did not restrict the right to privacy in Tennessee.' Specifically, the
Sundquist court asserted that the Tennessee Constitution and the judiciary's
interpretation of the right to privacy under the state constitution were more
extensive than the federal right.
The right of individual privacy under the Tennessee Constitution was first
expressly recognized by the court in Davis v. Davis.6 In Davis, the court held that
an ex-wife could not donate an embryo "created" by the couple during her previous
marriage to another woman when the ex-husband objected.6 The right of privacy
under the Tennessee Constitution was expansive enough to include the husband's
right not to procreate. The court reasoned that even though the right of individual
privacy was not explicit in the Tennessee Constitution, it was clearly intended to
be included and protected by the Tennessee Declaration of Rights.
Because the right to privacy was held to be fundamental under the state
constitution, the state in Sundquist was required to provide compelling
justifications for the HPA in order to overcome a strict scrutiny test.70 Tennessee
offered five "state interests" in support of the HPA. The justifications included:
1) discouraging acts that could not lead to procreation; 2) discouraging citizens
from choosing a lifestyle which is socially stigmatized and leads to suicide,
depression and drug and alcohol abuse; 3) discouraging homosexual relationships
which are assertedly shallow and merely intended for sexual gratification; 4)
prevention of the spread of infectious diseases; and 5) promotion of the moral
values of Tennessee citizens."
The first asserted state interest, discouraging acts that do not lead to
procreation, was deemed not sufficient under federal or state law to serve as a
compelling reason to uphold the HPA." The United States Supreme Court, in
Griswold, and the Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis, had previously held
that the right of privacy included the right to "procreational" autonomy." The
secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures." §
19: "Free communication of thoughts and opinions, is one of the invaluable rights of man and every
citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty."
Note also, that the court in Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), held that the right to privacy
extended primarily from Article L § 8.
67. Sundquist, 926 S.W. 2d at 260.
68. 842 S.W. 2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
69. Id. at 600; see also Sabine Koji, Constitutional Law Campbell v. Sundquist: Tennessee's
Homosexual Practices Act Violates the Right to Privacy, 28 U. Mem. L Rev. 311 (1997) (concluding
in part that Davis "evidenced the Tennessee Supreme Court's willingness to give rights dealing with
procreation and family the highest protection under the state constitution").
70. Sundquist, 926 S.W. 2d at 262.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485. 85 S. Ct. 1678, 1682(1965); Davis, 842 S.W.
at 601, where the Tennessee Supreme Court held that its individuals had the right to "procreate and the
right to avoid procreation." Thus, if there was a constitutional right for married and unmarried persons
to obtain contraceptives to avoid procreation, then, surely, procreation cannot be ajustification for this
statute.
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second and third justifications for the HPA, to prevent suicide and substance abuse
and to rescue homosexuals from "shallow" relationships, could be considered
compelling state interests,' but the state did not present any actual evidence that
the HPA addressed or prevented either of these asserted interests. The fourth
justification, prevention of the spread of infectious diseases, was also considered
compelling by the court, but the state was unable to show that the HPA was
narrowly tailored to address this need." Finally, while the promotion of morals in
Tennessee has been classified as a legitimate state interest in other areas, the court
held that the infringement of privacy in this case was too extensive.7" The
Tennessee court explained that:
[Wlhen these moral choices are transformed into law, they have
constitutional limits... Even if we assume that the [HPA] represents a
moral choice of the people of this state, we are unconvinced that the
advancement of this moral choice is so compelling as to justify the
regulation of private, noncommercial, sexual choices between consenting
adults .... 71
The rationale of the Tennessee court echoes the reasoning adopted by the Kentucky
court in Wasson. Under the strict scrutiny applied by the court in Sundquist, the
"moral choice of the majority" was not a sufficient justification for the
infringement of the right to privacy.
3. Georgia: A "Strict Scrutiny" Approach
In Powell v. State,5 the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the "right to be
let alone" as guaranteed by the Georgia "due process clause" provided more
extensive rights than the right of privacy protected by the United States
Constitution.' At issue in Powell was the constitutionality of the Georgia sodomy
statute-the same statute that the United States Supreme Court had found valid
under the United States Constitution in Bowers.' The defendant in Powell was
initially charged with aggravated sodomy but was convicted of the lesser charge of
"sodomy" pursuant to the Official Code of Georgia Annotated 16-6-2 § (a). He
74. This, however, is arguably not a "legitimate state interest," as it is not a part of state police
power to "protect" individuals from relationships that they choose to enterjust because the relationship
may not be as fulfilling as the government thinks it should be.
75. The court stated that the HPA could have the opposite effect and actually increase the spread
of infectious diseases. Because the individuals were fearful of prosecution under the HPA, they may
be less inclined to seek medical treatment for infections. Campbell, 926 S.W.2d at 263-64.
76. The court recognized that many of the state's laws reflect "moral choices" regarding the
standard of conduct by which citizens had to conduct themselves. But, at the same time, there are
constitutional limits to the impact of such regulations. Id. at 264.
77. Id. at 264-65.
78. 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
79. Id.
80. O.C.G.A. 16-6-2(a) defines sodomy as the performance of or submission to "any sexual act
involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another."
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appealled his conviction as an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. The Georgia
Supreme Court agreed and held that unforced, private, adult sexual activity was
encompassed by the right to privacy as guaranteed by Georgia's constitution."' The
court further explained that it could not think of any other activity that individuals
would perceive as more private and more deserving of protection by the
government than consensual sexual behavior."2 The majority supported this claim
by acknowledging that the "right of privacy" had always been valued by the
Georgia courts. The Powell court noted that since the Georgia Supreme Court
became the first court in the country to recognize the right of privacy, in Pavesich
v. New England Life Insurance," the Georgia appellate courts had acquired a "rich
appellate jurisprudence in the right of privacy which recognizes the right of privacy
as a fundamental constitutional right.""'
The dissent in Powell, however, disagreed with the majority's use of Pavesich
to validate the conduct in this case." It argued that because sodomy laws were in
effect at the time Pavesich was handed down and for decades after the decision,
their proscription was consistent with Georgia law.86 Furthermore, because the
composition of the court was the only factor that had changed since Pavesich, the
dissent implied that the outcome of the case was the result of the personal
preferences of the justices.8 7 Specifically, the dissent asserted, "this constitutional
'right' to engage in sodomy has been manufactured out of whole cloth by the
majority's misconstruction of Pavesich."" It stated that a constitutional right to
privacy obviously cannot include the right to engage in private conduct which was
condemned as criminal at the very time that the constitution was ratified."s
Because the majority in Powell considered privacy to be a fundamental right
which was infringed upon by the Georgia law at issue, the state was required to
muster some "compelling" interest to support the enforcement of the statute. The
state first argued that legislative "police power" to protect its citizens' lives, health,
and property and to preserve good order and public morals had been recognized as
a "compelling interest" in other areas and should be extended to encompass the
81. 510S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
82. Id. at 24.
83. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). See also Robert N. Katz, The History of the Georgia Bill of Rights,
3 Ga. St. L Rev. 83, 118 (1986-87).
84. Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 21.
85. Id. at 27. The dissent stated that Pavesich had not held that the citizens of Georgia had an
immutable right to engage in private consensual sodomy or any other conduct that was proscribed by
the Georgia legislature. Pavesich only defined the right of privacy generally as an implicit element of
"liberty" guaranteed to the citizens.
86. This argument is not impressive. The United State Supreme Courtin Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1. 87 S.Ct. 1817 (1967), was, unpersuaded by a similar argument when faced with the
constitutionality of Virginia's miscengenation laws. The state asserted that because the miscengenation
laws were in existence at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, the framers must have
intended then to be consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Court was not impressed
with this justification and held the statute unconstitutional.
87. Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 28.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 30.
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prohibition of sodomy ° However, the Georgia court held that the legislation
exceeded the police power of the state. Because the statute's sole purpose was to
regulate the private conduct of consenting adults, there was no public benefit from
the enforcement of the statute." With no justifiable state interest, the Georgia court
would not allow this invasion of the right to privacy under the guise of the "police
power."9
The majority also rejected the separation of powers argument by the state that
the court should not involve itself in the decisions of the legislature. 3 The court
explained that merely because the legislature enacts a law that may impact the
public's moral choices, courts are not "bound to simply acquiesce.""4 "Moral
legislation," like any other law, was subject to review by the courts under the
checks and balances system The court candidly stated that "if we were called upon
to pass upon the propriety of the conduct herein involved, we would not condone
it," but recognized that the judiciary could not base its decisions on personal moral
beliefs."
B. Sodomy Statutes Upheld Under Federal or State Constitutions'
Several state courts have upheld the constitutionality of state sodomy statues
against both federal" and state challenges.' However, the analysis of most state
courts in this area has paralleled that of the federal courts. In State v. Santos" and
State v. Poe"W for example, the respective state courts upheld the application of
90. See Goldrush U v. City of Marietta, 482 SE. 2d 347 (Ga. 1997) (Georgia used the "po!ice
power" to combat the negative effects of the combination of alcohol and nude dancing); Cannon v.
Coweta County, 389 S.E.2d 329 (Ga. 1990) (police power used to limit land usage through zoning
restrictions); and Foster v. Ga. Bd. Of Chiropractic Exam'rs. 359 S.E.2d 877 (Ga. 1987) ("police
power" used to regulate the health professions). See also the sole dissent in Powell. which held that it
was not the proper function of the court to judicially repeal laws on purely sociological considerations.
If the General Assembly of Georgia determined that the long-recognized ban on sodomy should remain
in place, it was not the role of the court to interfere with the decision. Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 30.
91. As was explained by the Georgia court in Cannon v. Coweta County, 389 S.E. 2d 329 (Ga.
1990). to be a valid exercise of "police power," the legislation has to serve a public purpose, be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppress those regulated
by the statute.
92. Powell. 510 S.E.2d at 30.
93. Id. at 25.
94. Id. (citation omitted).
95. Id.
96. This section of research proved more difficult in attempting to coalesce the current case law.
Several of the cases included "limiting factors" that may impinge their application to other cases. For
example, acts of sodomy occurring in public, forced sodomy acts, solicitation of sodomy. and sodomy
performed with a minor, are more case specific. When the cases are considered more generally.
however, the reasoning employed by the courts is helpful to understand why the state courts upheld their
sodomy statutes.
97. See supra note I.
98. State v. Gray, 413 N.W. 2d 107 (Minn. 1987).
99. 413 A.2d58(R.I. 1980).
100. 252 S.E.2d 843 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
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their sodomy statutes purely on federal grounds. In State v. Gray,"1 the Minnesota
Supreme Court considered but rejected a challenge to its sodomy statutes on state
constitutional grounds.
1. Rhode Island and North Carolina: Analysis Under a "Federal
Framework"
In State v. Santos,"m the defendant was charged with transporting women for
immoral purposes and committing an abominable crime against nature. The
defendant argued that Rhode Island's sodomy statute"°3 violated his right to engage
in private, sexual, consensual activities under the state and federal constitutions.
The state supreme court, however, held that the decision of unmarried adults to
engage in private consensual activity was not of such a fundamental nature to
warrant its inclusion in the guarantee of personal privacy."° The state court
incorporated the "privacy" precedent of the United States Supreme Court
concluding that the Supreme Court decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut,"W
Eisenstadt v. Baird,"se Roe v. Wade, 7  Carey v. Population Services
International,'" and Doe v. Commonwealth "re should be read to limit the right of
privacy to matters relating to childbearing. Because "private unnatural copulation
between unmarried adults" had no relation to childbearing, the right of privacy was
deemed inapplicable to the actions in this case."'
In Santos, the Rhode Island Supreme Court did not consider whether the
state's interest was furthered by the statute or the possibility that the state could
101. 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987).
102. 413 A.2d 58 (R.I. 1980). Rhode Island has since declared I 11-10-1 (Supp. 1999)
unconstitutional under an Equal Protection analysis in State v. McGovern, No. WI/97-0053 (BXC),
1998 WL 252236 (R.I. Super. Apr. 24, 1998), because thestatute unnecessarily distinguished between
married and unmarried persons.
103. R.I. Gen. Laws. § 11-10.1 (Supp. 1999).
104. Santos, 413 A.2d at 68.
105. 381 U.S. 479,85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965) (generally holding that the right of privacy forbid the
state from prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married persons); see supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
106. 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972) (holding that the state could not prohibit the use of
contraceptives by unmarried persons) see supra note I I and accompanying text.
107. 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy restricted the state from
proscribing a woman's right to an abortion); see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
108. 431 U.S. 678, 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977) (In which the Supreme Court held that a New York
statute that criminalized the unauthorized sale or distribution of contraceptives violated the right to
privacy. The Court further noted that even though the outer limits of the protection afforded to
individual decision making were not yet defined, decisions relating to marriage, contraception,
procreation and family relationships clearly were protected).
109. 425 U.S. 901.96 S. Ct. 1489 (1976) (the U.S. Supreme Court summarily affirmed a District
Court judgment that had upheld a Virginia sodomy statute against a privacy challenge); see also James
J. Rizzo, The Constitutionalily of SodomyStatutes, 45 Fordham L Rev. 553 (1976) (comment broadly
asserts that after Doe, the "state prohibition of private consensual acts of sodomy between adults raises
no question of the abridgment of fundamental rights in the judgment of the court") Id.
110. Doe v. Commonwealth, 425 U.S. 901,425 S. Ct. 1489 (1976).
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provide more protection than a collective reading of federal precedents delineating
the right of privacy. Although the Rhode Island Superior Court later recognized
that the state's purpose in enacting the statute was to "prevent immoral
behavior,""' the Santos court upheld the statute without discussion of the state's
real interest in its enforcement. It is notable that although the defendant challenged
the validity of the statute under both federal and state privacy guarantees, the court
chose only to address the issue under federal law. The court adhered to a narrow
reading of the federal decisions to uphold the Rhode Island statute."'
In State v. Poe,"3 the Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that the
prosecution of the defendant under North Carolina's "crime against nature"
statute" 4 did not violate his right to privacy. "' The defendant had argued that
because the act of fellatio was done in private, by adults, and with the consent of
the parties, his conduct was protected under the right to privacy. The North
Carolina court, however, reasoned that the privacy protections afforded by the
United States Supreme Court in Griswold and Eisenstadt were not applicable to
this case. Specifically, the court stated, "[i(n this case the state has proscribed
certain sexual conduct. In Eisenstadt sexual conduct was not proscribed-merely
the use of contraceptives while engaging in that conduct by unmarried persons."' 16
The court then concluded its discussion of the privacy issue by noting that the state
was allowed to forbid certain types of sexual conduct under the federal
Constitution.
Although the reasoning of the state court in Poe is admittedly brief, it is
instructive in two ways. First, the court did not address the possibility that it could
extend privacy protections beyond those provided by the federal government. Like
the Rhode Island court in Santos, the Poe court offered a limited interpretation of
the federal precedent construing the right of privacy and upheld the statute. The
second notable aspect of Poe is the lack of discussion concerning the state's
justification for the statute. The court firmly stated that the "state can proscribe
certain types of sexual conduct" and required no substantive reasoning by the state
to support the application of the statute. Further, because no fundamental right was
111. State v. Lopes, No. P1/90-3789, 1994 WL930907 (R.I. Super. Mar. 14, 1994).
112. The opinion did not contain any reference to the state law claim raised by the defendant. The
absence of this discussion could mean that the court considered the state law to be parallel to the federal
interpretation in Bowers. However, it could also be inferred that under these facts, the state court was
unwilling to strike down the statute, but left open the possibility that under more appealing facts, the
court would strike down the statute.
113. 252 S.E.2d 843 (N.C. 1979).
114. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177(1999).
115. N.C. Gen. Star. § 14-77 (1999) provides: "If any person shall commit the crime against
nature, with mankind or beast, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be fined or imprisoned in the
discretion of the court." Defendant was initially charged with the rape of a female and commission of
the crime against nature. The court dismissed the charge of rape and defendant was only convicted of
the performance of fellatio.
116. Poe, 252 S.E.2d at 845.
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deemed to be infringed upon, the North Carolina court did not discuss the varying
levels of scrutiny that could be applied." 7
While Santos and Poe were based on a refusal to extend Griswold, the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Bowers seems to provide state courts with a
clearer avenue through which they can uphold the enforcement of state sodomy
statutes."' Rather than sifting through the holdings of Griswold and its progeny
to determine whether the right of privacy was intended to encompass the private
sexual acts regulated by sodomy statutes, state courts can rely on the holding in
Bowers to conclude that homosexual sodomy is not a protected fundamental right.
2. Minnesota: Upholding Its Sodomy Law Under a "State Framework"
In State v. Gray,"9 the male defendant was charged with a violation of the state
sodomy statute for allegedly engaging in sex with a male prostitute."n The
defendant argued that the sodomy statute was unconstitutional because there was
a fundamental right under the federal and state constitutions for consenting adults
to engage in private sexual conduct in the privacy of their home. The Minnesota
Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the United States Supreme Court
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick clearly defeated the defendants's argument that the
state statute violated the federal Constitution. However, the court agreed that state
constitutions were allowed to provide more fundamental rights than the federal
Constitution and that fundamental rights were not limited to those expressly
identified in the state constitution. '' The Gray court noted that while the right to
privacy established in the Minnesota Bill of Rights only protects fundamental
rights, it was not limited by the United States Supreme Court's decisions in
deciding whether a right was considered fundamental.' "
117. The court did not discuss the applicability of even the rational basis to the facts of the case.
Presumably, the court would have found a rational relationship between the government regulation and
the conduct proscribed, but the decision did not reflect any such analysis.
118. 478U.S. 186,106S.Ct. 2841 (1986);see, e.g.,Schochetv. State, 580A.2d 176(Md. 1990)
(holding that the unnatural or perverted sexual practices, prohibited in Md. Code Ann., Crimes and
Punishments art. 27 § 554 (1957), did not encompass within its scope consensual, noncommercial
heterosexual activities between adults in the privacy of the home.); Santillo v. Commonwealth of
Virginia, 517 S.E.2d 733 (Va. 1999) (holding that defendant's conviction under the state sodomy
statute was not unconstitutional because the victim was a minor and the proscribed conduct was not
consensual).
119. 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987).
120. Defendant had allegedly picked up another male at a public place where the two retired to his
home and Gray performed sodomous acts upon the other and Gray paid the other at the conclusion of
the act. Minn. Stat. § 609.293 (1986) subdivision 1 defines sodomy as "carnally knowing any person
by the anus or by or with the mouth." Minn. Stat. § 609.293 subdivision 5 (1986) states that "whoever
: ..voluntarily engages in or submits to an act of sodomy with another may be sentenced to
imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3000 or both."
121. 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987).
122. Id. at Ill. The Court drew from its analysis in State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1985)
in which the court stated that "as the highest court of this state, we are independently responsible for
safeguarding the rights of [our) citizens."
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After hinting that the Minnesota right to privacy may be interpreted beyond the
limits of the federal jurisprudence, the Gray court turned to the issue of whether
the defendant had standing to challenge the sodomy statute. Ultimately, the court
concluded that Gray did not have standing to challenge the statute because adecision in his case would "not affect persons not before the court so directly that
their interest should be considered."' 3 Although the defendant was not charged
with a prostitution offense, the court reasoned that "[tihe facts involved would
sustain a charge of prostitution against Gray" and "the lack of a charge does not
erase from our review the fact of its occurrence."'' The court then explained that
although the sodomous acts were not performed in public, they were "public in
every other way."'" Because Gray had met the other "participant" in a public park
known to be a haven for young prostitutes, the encounters between the two men
were "one night stands," and the acts were performed for compensation, the court
refused to accept the behavior as "private." Rather, the court concluded that
"[g]iven the public nature of this case, the closing of the bedroom door did not
insulate the activity from the law."' 26 However, the court limited the decision in
Gray to its facts and left the door open for a future challenge to the statute when
presented with different facts.'"
By formulating a"commercial sex" distinction, the Minnesota court effectively
evaded the issue of whether the right to privacy protects adult, private consensual
sodomy.1' 8 The court seemed bold in its asserted willingness to extend the right ofprivacy from the state constitution beyond the parameters set by the federaljurisprudence, but fell short of such an extension in Gray.
I[. LOUISIANA LAW
A. Overview of Louisiana Privacy Guarantees
Unlike the United States Constitution, the text of Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana
Constitution expressly guarantees that every citizen shall be secure in his "person"
against "unreasonable searches, seizures or invasions ofprivacy."'29 The text of theArticle has been interpreted to provide greater protections to individuals than the
123. Gray, 413 N.W. 2d at 113.
124. Id. at 114.
125. if. at 113.
126. Id. at 114
127. The court specifically stated. "(tloday's decision is limited to a holding that any asserted
Minnesota constitutional privacy right does not encompass the protection of those who traffic in
commercial sexual conduct." Id.
128. See Constitutional Law: Minnesota Recognizes a Right to Privacy. 14 Wm. Mitchell L Rev.193 (1988) (suggesting that the court created the distinction for the purpose of denying the particular
defendant the privacy protections in this case). The note specifically states, "[olne can imply from thedecision that the reason the court did not address the issue was its unwillingness to let the Minnesota
Constitution protect an admitted sex offender." Id. at 198.
129. La. Const. art. 1, § 5.
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* federal Constitution.i" As the Louisiana Supreme Court stated in Guidry v.
Roberts:'
[O]ur state constitution's declaration of individual rights... represents
more specific . . . [and] may represent broader protection of the
individual,"' and is... far broader and more definitively articulated than
corresponding rights in the Federal Constitution. 33
The expansive scope of Article I, § 5 has been recognized most often in the area
of unreasonable search and seizure." However, in Arsenaux v. Arsenaux'3" the
court extended the protection of the privacy clause to civil litigation. The court
held that a wife could not be compelled to disclose evidence of an abortion
allegedly obtained by her during the existence of the marriage." Forced disclosure
of the information was considered a violation of her privacy rights under federal
jurisprudence and state safeguards inherent in Article 1, § 5 of the Louisiana
Constitution. "'
130. Statev. Perry. 610 So. 2d 746,755 (La. 1992). The Perry court stated. "them does not appear
to have been a single instance in which this court has held that the Declaration of Rights affords less
protection of individual liberties than did the Bill of Rights or other provisions of the federal
constitution under the pre-existing Supreme Court interpretations." Id. But as other scholars have
recognized, the deference to and persuasiveness of the state constitution over the federal Constitution
in all cases was not carried out in lateropinions. See John Devlin, 1992-1993 Louisiana Constitutional
Law: Review of Recent Developments, 54, La. L Rev. 683 (1994); Lisa Munyon, Comment, "It's a
Sorry Frog Who Won't Holler in his Own Pond": The Louisiana Supreme Court's Response to the
Challenges of New Federalism, 42 Loy. L Rev. 313 (1996). See also John Devlin, Privacy and
Abortion Rights Under she Louisiana State Constitution: Could Roe v. Wade be Alive and Well in the
Bayou State?, 51 La. L Rev. 686 (1991). In the examination'of the origin of privacy rights in
Louisiana the author points out that "The Supreme Court of Louisiana has on numerous occasions
expressed its agreement with these general principles and held that the state constitution provides
greater protection of individual rights than does the federal Constitution." Id. at 688. Compare,
Timothy Lenz, "Rights Talk" About Privacy in State Courts, 60 Alb. L Rev. 1613, 1615 (1997) in
which the author posits that the Louisiana "right to privacy" is "qualified" because the clause refers only
to searches and seizures rather than declaring a broad, general right to privacy.
131. 335 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976) (Tate, J.).
132. Id. at 448. (Tate, J.).
133. Id. at 452. (Summers, J., dissenting).
134. State v. Tucker, 626 So. 2d 720 (La. 1993) (The Louisiana Supreme Court explained that the
freedom from unreasonable searches and scizures was more expansive than the Federal counterpart, but
the Court then analyzed and decided the case like the United States Supreme Court had in California
v. Hodari D, 499 U.S. 62 1 11 S. Ct. 1547 (199 1) to effectively give the defendant less protection from
government search and seizure; State v. Church. 538 So. 2d 993 (IA. 1989) (Court held DWI
roadblocks were not constitutional under the State Constitution); State v. Hemandez, 410 So. 2d 1381
(La. 1982) (Court held that a vehicle search contemporaneous to a lawful arrest was prohibited by L.a
Const. Art. I § 5); State v. Breaux, 329 So. 2d 696 (Ia. 1976).
135. 428 So. 2d 427 (La. 1983).
136. Id. at 430.
137. Id. See also Richard Bullock, Comment, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974: The Louisiana Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 51 La. L Rev. 787, 811
(1991) (noting that the court in Arseneaux explained, "them are strong constitutional considerations
[Article 1, § 5] weighing against the admission of this evidence.").
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In Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, the Louisiana Supreme Court extended the
right to privacy even further and held that the right applied to a decision whether
to obtain or reject medical treatment."' The plaintiff in Houndroulis had claimed
that her consent before surgery was not "informed" because she was not aware of
all foreseeable risks involved." 9 The Houndroulis court noted that the decision to
undergo medical treatment was similar to individual decisions concerning
marriage, "contraception, ""and family relations." 2 The effect of Hondroulis was
significant because it explicitly allowed the "privacy provision" in Article I, § 5 to
be employed in areas affecting personal autonomy. 4" Hondroulis has been hailed
as the first time that the Louisiana Supreme Court "squarely recognized that the
state constitutional right of privacy also incorporates and independently protects
autonomy-type privacy rights from unreasonable legislative interference."' "
Likewise, in State v. Perry,'" the Court recognized that the scope of Article
I, § 5 necessarily protected the personal autonomy of insane prisoners on death
row. The court held that the state could not medicate an incompetent death row
prisoner with anti-psychotic drugs against his will to accommodate the state's
execution. Forced medication by the state violated the prisoner's right to personal
autonomy as recognized in Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution."
Scholars have agreed that the Framers of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution
intended "privacy" to extend beyond the criminal sphere of protection to protect
personal autonomy from infringement by state regulations. One scholar has argued
that because the deliberations over the scope of "privacy" in Louisiana took place
in the immediate wake of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Roe and
Doe, the founders were aware of the necessary implications of an express right to
138. 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1988).
139. Id. The constitutional impact of the decision was to provide that signed medical consent
forms did not create an irrebutable presumption of informed consent.
140. Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,87S. Ct. 1817(1967).
141. Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972).
142. Pricev. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 15, 64 S. Ct. 438(1944).
143. John Devlin, Privacy and Abortion Rights Under the Louisiana State Constitution: Could
Roe v. Wade be Alive and Well in the Bayou State?, 51 La. L Rev. 686, 707 (1991). See also Cindy
Matheme, Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher: The Crusade Back to Canterbury, 50 La. L Rev. 1195 (1990).
144. Devlin. supra note 143. at 707.
145. 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992). See also John Devlin, Louisiana Constitutional Law: Review of
Recent Developments: 1992-93, 54 La. L Rev. 683, 684 (1994) (author notes that while the holding
in Perry was "narrow" and "unlikely to be often repeated," it "represents an important step in the
Louisiana Supreme Court's ongoing relationship with its federal counterpart, and a significant milestone
in the interpretation of the state constitution's guarantees of privacy...").
146. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 747. Specifically, the court held that involuntary medication was an
unjustified invasion of the individual's brain and body... and a seizure of the control of his mind and
thoughts and the usurpation of this right to make decisions regarding his health or medical treatment.
The court distinguished Perry from Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210. 110 S.Ct. 1028, in which the
U.S. Supreme Court held that while forcing antipsychotic drugs was impermissible, the state was
allowed to administer them if there was an overriding justification for the medications and a
determination of medical appropriateness. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 751.
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privacy.'47 The right of privacy should thus be interpreted to protect more than
criminal rights. It also served as a shield against attacks on personal autonomy by
the state and other individuals. The Coordinator of Legal Research at the 1974
Louisiana Constitutional Convention explained that the right of privacy in Article
I, § 5 of the constitution has effects "beyond the domain of criminal procedure; and
the section establishes an affirmative right to privacy which will also have an
impact on the non-criminal areas of the law."'4 Further, the placement of the
privacy provision in the Louisiana Constitution separate and apart from the
provisions of criminal procedure begged the necessary conclusion that the right of
privacy was not intended to be limited to criminal procedure but to apply to other
areas of the law.
B. Louisiana Courts and Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:89
The constitutionality of Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:8914' has been
challenged in the Louisiana Supreme Court on more than one occasion. In State
v. McCoy, '" for example, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the statute was
not an unconstitutional invasion of the federal right to privacy."' In State v.
Baxley,152 the court reversed a decision which held that the statute was an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy under the Louisiana Constitution Article I, §
5 by denying standing to the appellant.'53 In his dissent, Chief Justice Pascal
147. Devlin, supra note 143, at 700. In Roe and Doe the U.S. Supreme Court generally held that
the right to privacy of the Fourteenth Amendment protected a woman's right to an abortion. Therefore.
the state had only a limited right to regulate abortions.
148. Lee Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 La. L
Rev. 1, 20 (1974). Hargrave also predicted that the Article I, § 5 would be a "fertile ground for
development in tort law as well as the non-criminal aspects of government operation." Id. at 21.
149. See supra note 2.
150. State v. McCoy, 337 So. 2d 192 (La. 1976).
151. Id. at 196. The defendant had argued that the statute was unconstitutional under Griswold
if applied to consenting adults. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court relied on the U.S. Supreme
Court's then recent affirmance of a Virginia court decision (Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney forCity
of Richmond. 425 U.S. 901,96 S. Ct. 1489 (1976)) that had upheld the constitutionality of the Virginia
statute criminalizing consensual sodomy. The Court also held that La. R.S.14:89 (1986) was not
unconstitutionally vague and indefinite and the verdict of a crime against nature was responsive to a
charge of aggravated crime against nature. See also: State v. Lindsey, 310 So. 2d 89 (La. 1975); State
v. Woljar, 477 So. 2d 80 (1985) (rejecting defendants arguments that La. R.S.14:89(A)(2) was
unconstitutionally vague and that solicitation was merely an attempted crime against nature and it was
unconstitutional to elevate an attempt to the same status as the completed offense); State v. Neal, 500
So. 2d 374,379 (La. 1987) (holding that La. R.S. 14:89(A)(2) was not unconstitutionally vague and did
not violate the defendant's freedom of speech); State v. Langendorfer, 389 So. 2d 1271 (La. 1980)
(affirming defendant's conviction of forcible rape and simple crime against nature while not passing
judgment on the defendant's argument that the statute was an unconstitutional invasion of privacy).
152. 633 So. 2d 142 (La. 1994).
153. On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that because the defendant was charged with
violating La. R.S.14:89(A)(2). he did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of La.
R.S.14:89(A)(1). The court never reached the issue of whether La. R.S. 14:89(AXi) violated the state
constitutional right to privacy because the defendant was not charged under the specific subpart of the
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Calogero argued that Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:89 was an invasion of privacy
under the Louisiana Constitution. 4 He reasoned that because the statute affected
individual privacy, it should be narrowly drawn and must be justified by a
compelling state interest. Finding no justification in the state's arguments, he
concluded the statute was unconstitutional.'s The majority's opinion in Baxley has
been criticized for dodging the constitutional issue and basing its decision on the
less compelling procedural issue of standing. As one critic explained, "[bly
confining itself to 'standing' and a dexterous severing of the statute far beyond the
state's own approach, the court skirted any discussion of the constitutional issues
involved and successfully preserved the sodomy law on the books.""'
The Louisiana Supreme Court had another opportunity to review the facts in
Baxley when the case was again presented a year later.' 7 The court held that the
statute criminalizing solicitation of another with intent to engage in anal copulation
did not, on its face, violate state equal protection guarantees, was not enacted for
a discriminatory purpose, and did not carry an excessive sentence.' The court
reasoned that even though there was a disparity between the punishment for
solicitation of prostitution and the punishment for solicitation of a crime against
nature, the statues applied to homosexuals and heterosexuals equally.' 9 Although
the statutes punished distinct acts in different ways, separate classes of individuals
were not treated differently. In holding that the punishment under the statute was
not excessive, the court deferred to the "province of the legislature" to determine
which crimes were more "offensive to the public morals than others."'60
statute. It is also interesting to note that the Criminal District Court in McCoy based its opinion on prior
assertions by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Neal, 500 So. 2d 374 (La. 1987) and State v.
Perry. 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992). The district court reasoned that the sodomy statute was clearly
unconstitutional as "Our Constitution creates an explicit right to privacy. Article I, § 5 protects our
citizens from invasions of privacy that the federal government does not." The Supreme Court was not
persuaded.
154. 633 So. 2d 142, 146 (La. 1994).
155. Id.
156. Evan Wolfsan & Robert Mower, When the Police are in Our Bedrooms, Shouldn't the Court
Go in After Them? An Update on the Fight Against "Sodomy" Laws, 21 Fordham Urb. LJ. 997
(1994).
157. State v. Baxley, 656 So. 2d 973 (La. 1995) (holding did not reflect any consideration of the
"privacy issue" present in Smith as La. R.S. 14:89 was not challenged as an infringement on the right
to privacy).
158. The trial court had held that La. R.S.14:89 was unconstitutional on its face because it
punished solicitation for a "crime against nature" more stringently than it punished a crime for
prostitution under La. R.S. 14:82. The disparity is clear. Under La. R.S. 14:89, the first offense for
solicitation of unnatural carnal copulation is a felony and subjects the defendant to a fine of not more
than $2000 or imprisonment for not more than five years or both. But, a first offense for solicitation
of prostitution under La. R.S.14:82 is a misdemeanor and subject the defendant to a fine of not more
than $500 or imprisonment for not more than six months.
159. Baxley. 656 So. 2d at 979.
160. Id.
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IV. STATE V. SMITH: WILL LOUISIANA CONSTrruTIONAL RIGHTS EXCEED
THOSE AFFORDED BY THE FEDERAL CONSTrTUTION?
In State v. Smith, 6' the Louisiana Supreme Court is faced with a challenge to
the constitutionality of Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:89 as an invasion of privacy
under the Louisiana Constitution." The defendant in Smith was initially charged
with one count of aggravated crime against nature and one count of simple rape.
The trial court found the defendant not guilty of simple rape or aggravated crime
against nature, but did find the defendant guilty of the responsive verdict of simple
crime against nature under Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:89(A)(1). 13 In his appeal
to the fourth circuit, the defendant argued that his conviction under 14:89 was
unconstitutional because the statute was vague, overbroad, and a violation of his
right to privacy. The fourth circuit dismissed the defendant's claims that the statute
was vague or overbroad, but held that the statute was an unconstitutional invasion
of the fundamental right to privacy under the state constitution.'" Because a
fundamental right was infringed, the fourth circuit employed strict judicial scrutiny
to determine whether the statute was necessary to accomplish a compelling
governmental end. 65 According to the court of appeal, the statute failed the strict
scrutiny test because the state had offered no compelling interest to justify the
criminalization of noncommercial sexual conduct that occurred without force
between two consenting adults. The opinion stated that the state had made no
effort to justify its interest:
We have received no guidance from the State of Louisiana that will assist
us in deciding the constitutionality of [Louisiana Revised Statutes] 14:89
(A)(1) in the context of this appeal. The District Attorney, although
arguing that there is no sound reason to depart from the long history of
jurisprudence upholding 14:89, has advanced no compelling state interest.
Following the decision of the fourth circuit, the state applied for writs to the
Louisiana Supreme Court. In its appeal, the state presented two principal
arguments: 1) fellatio or oral sex does not enjoy protection under the Louisiana
Privacy Clause-Louisiana Constitution Article I, § 5; and 2) the acts in question
were not consensual acts.'" Neither of these two arguments should be sufficient
for the supreme court to reverse the decision of the appellate court. The recurrent
plea throughout petitioner's brief was that because there was no evidence adduced
161. State v. Smith, 729 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999).
162. Smith seems to provide the Court with the "ideal fact pattern" in which to strike down La.
R.S. 14:89. It does not include violent or public acts and is challenged in a "heterosexual" context. As
is noted later, the court may be more willing to strike down the statue when applied to heterosexual
conduct than if applied to homosexual conduct.
163. State v. Smith, 729 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999).
164. Id. at 651-54.
165. Id. at651-52.
166. See Brief of Appellant at 4. State v. Smith, 729 So.2d 648 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-
KA-0606).
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during the trial pertaining to the privacy issue, the state should not now be forced
tojustify the statute before the supreme court. After noting this point, however, the
state did not attempt to offer any compelling justifications for the statute.'67
Since Smith, other circuits have applied the privacy clause to hold other
criminal statutes unconstitutional. In State of Louisiana v. BrenanIs for example,
the first circuit extended the protection of the privacy clause of the state
constitution to strike down Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:106.1, dealing with
"obscene devices," as unconstitutional.'" The court suggested that the decision
of the fourth circuit in Smith provided the impetus for its holding. Citing Smith, the
concurring opinion reasoned,
[Olur brethren of the Fourth Circuit concluded that the statute (14:89)
violated the right to privacy under the Louisiana Constitution to the extent
that it criminalizes the performance of private, consensual, non-
commercial acts of sexual intimacy between individuals who are legally
capable of giving their consent. If Louisiana's right to privacy protects
non-commercial, consensual oral sex ... it could be asserted that the
Legislature would face great difficulty proscribing or even restricting the
sale of obscene devices intended for private use in the home between
consenting adults. 7 '
The fact that other circuits are using the fourth circuit's decision in Smith as a
"springboard" to extend the right of privacy in other areas should prompt the
Louisiana Supreme Court to decide this case on the merits and provide guidelines
for the appellate courts to follow. The decisions in the lower courts illustrate the
need for a delineation of the scope of the right to privacy in areas infringing on
personal autonomy and "sexual behavior," whether it be an expansive or limited
interpretation.
In the case now before the supreme court, the state has urged the Louisiana
Supreme Court to follow the decisions in Bowers and McCoy, arguing that there
is no right to sodomy under the Privacy Clause of the Louisiana Constitution."'
However, the state's reliance on Bowers is misplaced. First, Louisiana is not under
167. Also, the state urges the court to defer its decision on the constitutionality ofLa. R.S. 14:89
(1986) to await the appeal of ongoing litigation over the same statute in Civil District Court in Orleans
Parish. See supra note 166 at 6. where the state refers to the litigation in Louisiana Electorate of Gays
and Lesbians Inc. v. State of Louisiana, Docket number 94-09260. However, the fact that there is
concurent litigation on the same statute should not permit the state to escape its duty to justify the
statute in Smith.
168. State of Louisiana v. Brenan. 739 So. 2d 368 (La. App. I st Cir. 1999).
169. La. R.S. 14:106.1 (1986) prohibits the knowing and intentional promotion of obscene
devices.
170. State of Louisiana v. Brenan, 739 So. 2d 368 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1999). See also Williams v.
Pryor, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (1999). in which the Northern Division of the United States District Court
in Alabama held that the Alabama statute prohibiting the sale or use of obscene devices violated the
fundamental right to privacy and bore no reasonable, rational relation to a legitimate state interest. Id.
at 1292-93.
171. La. Const., Art. 1, § 5.
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any duty to follow the holding in Bowers.172 In fact, the opinion in Bowers clearly
explained that its decision did not affect contrary conclusions of the same issue
under state law.1" The Louisiana Supreme Court has no reason to limit its analysis
to the interpretation of the right of privacy under federal law. If the court is sincere
in its opinion that the Louisiana Constitution provides greater privacy rights than
those assured under the federal Constitution, the statute in question should be
declared unconstitutional. The decision in McCoy is no more persuasive merely
because it was also based on a claim to privacy under the federal Constitution. The
result in that case was inevitable given the state court's obligation to follow the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court because the statute had been
challenged on federal grounds.'?4 Because Smith has challenged the statute solely
on state constitutional grounds, the decision in McCoy is not applicable.
Finally, because the Louisiana Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted
Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution to provide privacy protections beyond
the domain of criminal procedure and to be broader than its federal counterpart, it
should operate under those principles and uphold the decision of the appellate
court. After the decisions in Perry and Hondroulis, the court should recognize that
the state constitution's guaranty of privacy should protect individual autonomy.
The state conveniently does not discuss the extent of personal autonomy rights
provided to Louisiana citizens. The Louisiana Supreme Court, therefore, must
resolve the issue of whether it is tolerable for the state to intrude on such private
acts between consenting individuals through Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:89.
The state has given the court no reason to answer the question in the affirmative.
V. LESSONS LEARNED: WHAT CAN THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT TAKE
FROM THESE DECISIONS?
In reaching its decision in State v. Smith, the Louisiana Supreme Court should
take guidance from the other states that have confronted the same issue. Those
states that have rejected their sodomy statutes as an invasion of privacy should
support the arguments asserted by the defendant in Smith. However, the states that
have rejected challenges to their sodomy statutes may temper the persuasiveness
of the defendant's position. There are overlapping and unique aspects of the cases
that should be carefully considered by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
172. Paula Brantner, Removing Bricks from a Wall of Discrimination: State Constitutional
Challenges to Sodomy Laws, 19 Hastings Const. LQ. 495 (Winter 1992). The author pointed out that
after Bowers, "the strongest possibility for sodomy law reform may rest with the state courts." The
majority in Bowers expressly stated that its decision 'did not affect state court decisions invalidating
those laws on state constitutional grounds."'
173. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190, 106 S. Ct. 2841,2843 (1986).
174. State v. McCoy, 337 So. 2d 192, 196 (La. 1976).
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A. Fundamental Rights and the Appropriate Standards of Review
1. Fundamental Rights
At the outset, it should be noted that the Louisiana Supreme Court is not
restrained by the holding in Bowers that there is no fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy.' Each of the state courts that rejected its state sodomy
statutes clearly explained that the breadth of the right of privacy under the state
constitution was in no .way limited by Bowers.'76 For example, because the
Kentucky Constitution provided an explicit right to privacy, the court in Wasson
concluded that the consensual sexual acts between adults should fall within the
scope of that right.' Although neither the Georgia nor the Tennessee
Constitutions contained an explicit protection of privacy, both courts reasoned that
within the text of their constitutions and jurisprudential history there had developed
a guarantee of privacy which was broad enough to encompass private consensual
sexual acts between adults.17 s
However, states are not required to establish rights more expansive than those
provided by the federal Constitution, and several state courts have refused to forge
beyond the federal limits delineated in Bowers to establish a broader right of
privacy. In Santos, Poe, and Gray, the state courts upheld their sodomy statues on
grounds set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Griswold, Eisentadt, Roe,
Carey and Doe without any attention to their state constitutions. 79
Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana constitution contains an explicit right of privacy.
This right has been interpreted by scholars and Louisiana courts to extend
protection beyond criminal law to areas of personal autonomy."'° The opinions in
Hondroulis and Perry are illustrative of the Louisiana courts' willingness to extend
the "right of privacy" to civil rights as well as those affected by criminal statutes.
The court in those cases recognized the fundamental right of citizens and prisoners
to refuse or reject medical treatment since governmental interference in those
decisions would infringe on areas of personal autonomy.
The right of adults to choose to engage in private consensual sodomy does not
seem any less "personal" or "private" than the right of adults to decide what
medical treatment they find appropriate for themselves. It would be hard to
articulate a holding that restricted the decisions made between consenting adults
in a private, sexual context that remained consistent with prior decisions that
175. 47 8 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
176. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487.493 (Ky. 1992); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926
S.W.2d 250,262 (Tenn. 1996); Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18. 24 (Ga. 1998).
177. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 491.
178. See Powell v. State discussed supra notes 84-89 for the discussion of Pavesich. in which the
Georgia Court recognized the fundamental right to privacy for its citizens. See Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d
at 260, for the tinging declaration by the Tennessee court that even though not explicit in its
constitution, "we have no hesitation in drawing the conclusion that there is a right of individual privacy
guaranteed under and protected by the liberty clauses of the Tennessee Declaration of Rights."
179. See supra notes 97-128 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 135-148 and accompanying text.
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prohibit such governmental interference in decisions made in a medical context.
The physical, sexual acts between consenting adults that occur in private merit
treatment as a fundamental right. In State v. Smith, the amicus brief filed by the
Lambda organization argued that "[s]ex is a chosen activity that may create or
affirm a deep bond while excluding the outside world and all other relations.
Certainly no one engaged in consensual sex expects other[s] to trespass on them;
they "iregard the very ideas of governmental intrusion as foreign and
unforeseeable."'
The rationale of the state courts in Tennessee and Georgia also provides
persuasive authority for the court to determine that the right at issue in Smith
should be "fundamental." While neither states' constitution provides an explicit
right to privacy, both states recognize that theirjudiciaries have expanded the scope
of their constitutions to include the right of privacy. Further, both courts
determined that the proscriptions of the state sodomy statutes infringe on the
fundamental right of privacy.
Given the intent and prior interpretation of Article I, § 5, the Louisiana
Supreme Court should distinguish Bowers and affirm the fundamental right of
Louisiana's consenting adults to be free from governmental interference in their
private decisions regarding private sexual conduct. Further, the court should
consider as persuasive the rationale of sister state courts that have declared such a
right to be fundamental under their own state constitutions.
2. Appropriate Standard of Review
The Louisiana Supreme Court may also refer to the decisions of sister states
in its consideration of the standard of review for evaluation of the constitutionality
of Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:89. The Tennessee and Georgia courts employed
a strict scrutiny test to determine whether their sodomy laws were justified
infringements on the recognized fundamental right to privacy under their state
constitutions. Under a strict scrutiny analysis, both courts concluded that the
infringement of the right of adults to engage in private, consensual sexual activities
was not necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. Using a rational basis
standard of review, the Kentucky court held that the state's justification for its
sodomy statute was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental end." 2
Assuming the Louisiana Supreme Court recognizes that the Louisiana
Constitution encompasses private, consensual sexual acts between adults as a
fundamental right, it should invoke the strict scrutiny standard of review as applied
by the Tennessee and Georgia courts and determine whether the infringement is
necessary to satisfy a compelling state interest. Further, the court should refrain
from utilizing the "undue burden test" selectively used by the United States
181. Amicus Brief by the Lambda Organization on behalf of the Appellee at 4, State v. Smith, 729
So.2d 648 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1999) (No. 97-KA-1393).
182. Commomwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W. 2d 487.491 (1992).
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Supreme Court in its analysis of several "fundamental rights."' 3  It seems
axiomatic that a court could in one breath determine that a right is "fundamental,"
and in the next allow the state to restrict its exercise because the "burden" by the
state was not too intrusive. As a "fundamental right," the acts proscribed by
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:89 deserve no less than strict scrutiny in determining
whether the statute infringes on the exercise of that right. Even if the Louisiana
Supreme Court were to hold that no fundamental right is infringed by Louisiana
Revised Statutes 14:89, it may still find, as the Kentucky court did in Wasson, that
its application does not satisfy a rational basis analysis.
3. State Justifications for the Regulation of Sodomy Through Legislation?
If the Louisiana Supreme Court chooses to employ the strict or rational basis
test, the state should be required to offer justification for its infringement of the
right to privacy and to demonstrate how the legislation is narrowly tailored to
further the purported state interest. To date, the state has failed to offer a single
rationale for the continued enforcement of Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:89.
One justification offered by all of the states in support of their sodomy statutes
was the "morality of the majority," presumably made manifest in the states'
legislation. The states argued that the will of the majority should not be superseded
by the courts' own opinions. In turn, each of the respective state courts that struck
down state sodomy statutes found the "morality of the majority" justification
insufficient to allow the infringement on individual privacy. In discussing the
weight ascribed to the "morals of the majority" argument in a strict scrutiny
analysis, the Georgia Supreme Court in Powell referred to such arguments in
Campbell and Wasson and concluded, "[n]o sufficient state interest justifies
legislation of norms simply because a particular belief is followed by a number of
people, or even a majority... legislative enactments are not exempt from judicial
review testing their constitutional mettle."'" In State v. Bonadio, n the
183. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (holding that state
legislatures could regulate the "fundamental right" of a woman to obtain an abortion as long as the
restriction did not constitute an "undue burden"); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Assn.,
485 U.S. 439. 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988) (rejecting a free exercise challenge to the Forest Service's plan
to permit timber harvesting in a forest traditionally used by Indian tribes as sacred ritual grounds
because the burden was not sufficiently severe as to require the government to demonstrate a compelling
interest).
The "undue burden test" requires a court to first determine whether a state regulation imposes an
"undue burden" on the exercise of a fundamental right. If the state regulation is found to place a
"substantial obstacle" in the path of the exercise of a fundamental right, the strict scrutiny test is then
used to determine whether the state justification are necessary to reach a compelling end. However, if
the restrictions do not impose an "undue burden" on a fundamental right, the state need only satisfy the
rational basis standard of review.
184. Powell v. State. 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998).
185. 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980) (holding that the statute violated the Equal Protection guarantees of
the state and federal constitution because it created a classification based on marital status where such
differential treatment was not supportWd by a sufficient state interest). Id. at 51. The case addressed the
constitutionality of the statute on Equal Protection grounds, but the asserted state justifications prove
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court opined that a state statute prohibiting voluntary
deviate sexual intercourse was unconstitutional and noted:
Valid exercise of the police power to regulate the public health, safety,
welfare and morals is not unlimited. Rather, for the state's action to be
justified, it must appear that the public interest requires such an
interference and that the means are reasonably necessary to accomplish
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals." 6
The court further acknowledged the states' role in protecting the public from
offensive displays of sexual behavior, forced sexual conduct, sexual abuse to
minors, and cruelty to animals, but noted that other statutes existed to protect the
public from such acts.' 7
. Beyond an assertion that sodomy statutes protect the morals of the majority,
Tennessee offered the most extensive list of "justifications" for its sodomy statute.
The state's espoused interests included the prevention of suicide, drug abuse,
shallow and self-gratifying relationships and the spread of disease. These
justifications were deemed by the court to be compelling, but were rejected because
the proscription of sodomy was not necessary to advance a state interest.' 8 Hence,
the role of the courts in evaluating the constitutionality of sodomy legislation
should be to ensure that the opinions of the majority manifested in legislation do
not infringe upon the protected rights of the minority without some actual need for
such regulations.
The Louisiana Supreme Court should consider the reasoning of courts in other
states rejecting the argument that the morals of the majority should subsume the
rights of the minority. The brief filed on behalf of the defendant in Smith provides
persuasive authority to reject a"moral majority" argument. I" In part, the defendant
argues that without a legitimate benefit to the public welfare, Louisiana Revised
Statutes 14:89 cannot be upheld on the "bald" assertion of public morality. Further,
the state has clearly refused to provide any justification for the statute.
None of the cases decided by the state courts that have upheld their states'
sodomy statutes against an invasion of privacy challenge have required the state to
present any exacting public need for the regulation. This result is not surprising,
however, because the courts in Santos, Poe, and Gray ultimately concluded that
there was no fundamental interest at stake through the application of the sodomy
statutes.
helpful in the discussion of state interests for sodomy statutes in general.
186. Id. at 49 (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133,137, 14 S. Ct. 499 (1894)).
187. Id.
188. Campbell v. Sundquist. 926 S.E.2d 250, 262-64 (Tenn. 1996).
189. American Civil Liberties Union Brief filed on behalf of defendant at 15. State v. Smith, 729
So. 2d 648 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999)(No. 97-KA-1393).
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B. Limits on a Decision in Smith
As the amicus briefs filed on behalf of the defendant suggest, the Louisiana
Supreme Court must not dodge the issue presented in Smith because of its wariness
to legitimate violent or public sexual acts. 19 Even the United States Supreme Court
has held that although a city can enforce ordinances directed at the conduct to be
prohibited, it should not attempt to do so through laws that are "constitutionally
infirm."'' A decision to revoke 14:89 could be limited to affect only the intrusion
of the government only into the private consensual acts between adults.
Finally, Smith seems to present the Louisiana Supreme Court with an
opportunity to declare Louisiana's sodomy statute unconstitutional. The facts of
Smith involve "heterosexual sodomy." There were no forced acts, no compensation
for performance of sodomous acts, and no relations with minors. The acts were
done in "private." However, the effects of Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:89 reach
both heterosexuals and homosexuals. Therefore, the Court should concern itself
more with the correct analysis of the state's constitution than with the popular (or
unpopular) opinion of its decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
State courts were explicitly given the latitude in Bowers to interpret their state
constitutions independently from the federal interpretation. There is no question
that states have the freedom to invalidate sodomy laws on state constitutional
grounds.'92 The Louisiana Supreme Court should embrace the permission of the
United States Supreme Court and overturn Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:89 as an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy. The text and history of Article I, § 5 support
the decision of the court to give a broad reading to the privacy protections
concerning personal autonomy in Louisiana. Thejurisprudence has already "paved
the way" for expansive interpretations of behavior inherent in personal autonomy.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas asked and answered a critical question,
"Would we allow the police to search the sacred premises of marital bedrooms for
the telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."' 9 3 Privacy concerns are
paramount when dealing with the private, consensual, sexual behavior of adults.
Absent any state justification, the court should take, without reservation, the bold
and imperative step to strike down Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:89 as an
unconstitutional invasion of individual privacy.
Martha Rundell
190. See supra note 166, at 14.
191. Coatesv. Cincinnati. 402U.S. 611,91 S. Ct. 1686(1971). Cf. Briefsupranote 166, at 15.
192. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
193. Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479, 485-86, 85 S.Ct. 1678. 1684 (1965). Although the
quote from Griswold refers specifically to the "marriage context," Elsenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438.
92 S. Ct 1029 (1972) later expanded the holding to apply to non-married individuals.
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